By: Sabrina Peña-Sy, a HISTOYOUTH Writer
The Cyprus Problem is widely considered one of the most intractable conflicts in the world, second to Israel-Palestine. Similarly, the Cyprus Problem is a conflict between two groups with distinct ethnicities and religions, and it is often thought to be a manifestation of a broader long-standing conflict between Greece and Turkey (Michael 2010). However, a key difference is that its stubborn nature is not characterized by violent armed conflict and fervent determination, but rather a lack of political will that has recently lulled into defeatism after decades of protracted, unsuccessful negotiation.
A cornerstone of the geopolitical deadlock was the Annan Plan, named after then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan was one in a long line of UN Secretary-Generals who have attempted and failed to resolve the Cyprus Problem, but the Annan Plan was a decidedly “unique and historic” opportunity to resolve the conflict (Michael 2007, 587). At that time, “international environment was very conducive to a solution,” and the Plan had received widespread support from the international community, including from the US and the UK (Hadjipavlou 2024); it had swayed the Turkish Cypriot majority despite overt opposition from hard-lined nationalist President Rauf Denktaş, but the 2004 referendum determined it dead in the water after 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it (Wright 2004).
Much of the discourse retrospectively analyzing the Annan Plan, and indeed, much of the discourse around the Cyprus problem in general, has been focused on the logistical concerns a solution would have to contend with, including security, governance, and property rights (Yilmaz 2010). However, the cycle of distrust, outrage, and intransigence from both sides begets one to wonder if logistical issues are truly the root cause of the Annan Plan failure. Given that the Green Line separates two distinct ethnic and religious groups with now centuries of intercommunal friction, one asks: to what extent was ethno-religious prejudice the main cause of the Annan Plan failure?
The answer is incredibly complicated, and no aspect can be called the main cause. This paper attempts to answer a question regarding the role of ethno-religious relations in the Annan Plan, and it ultimately argues that the failure was mostly caused by compounding intercommunal distrust and poor political leadership as opposed to the logistical issues that are often most debated about.
Historical Background
Cyprus was a part of the Roman and subsequent Greek-speaking Byzantine Empire from the first century BCE, until the twelfth century. Much of Greek-Cypriot culture derives their Greek ethnicity and orthodox religion from this period. After four centuries of Venetian rule, Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, under which Turkish people migrated to the island, forming the basis of today’s Turkish Cypriot community (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 12).
In 1878, the British Empire struck an agreement with a declining Ottoman Empire. It would control Cyprus for strategic purposes while the island remained under Ottoman territory, but later annexed Cyprus in 1914 during World War I, and took over full administrative control (Yilmaz 2010, 43). During this time, Greek Cypriot nationalism that supported unification with mainland Greece (enosis) cropped up, leading to armed intercommunal conflict that birthed Turkish Cypriot secessionism (taksim) during the 1950s.
A worsening sociopolitical climate pushed the British to leave the island, subsequently “forcing Cyprus into independence,” as the island was caught between enosis and taksim (Yilmaz 2010, 45). An independent republic was born in 1960. Britain, Greece, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Guarantee, establishing the three superpowers as guarantor nations who pledged to uphold the “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence” of Cyprus while each having the right to directly intervene at its discretion (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 27).
In 1963, widespread intercommunal violence led to the “de facto collaps[e]” of the Republic of Cyprus, and the next 11 years saw increasing conflict as Greek Cypriots militants attacked and forced Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. In 1974, the mainland Greek military regime backed and helped execute a successful coup d’etat, prompting Turkey to invade in fear of enosis (Yilmaz 2010, 48-9).
The invasion divided the island ethno-geographically; Turkish forces captured 38% of Cyprus' territory in the North, displacing 160,000 people as Turkish Cypriots fled north and Greek Cypriots fled south (Yilmaz 2010, 49; Ker-Lindsay 2011, 47). Turkish Cyprus then unilaterally declared independence in 1983, a move denounced by the international community and only recognized by Turkey. To this day, Cyprus is still divided by the Green Line, although borders opened in 2003 and promoted intercommunal travel without permanent settlement (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 51, 61).
Logistical Challenges
London School of Economics Professor of Greco-Turkish relations and the Cyprus Problem James Ker-Lindsay discusses the main logistical challenges of the Annan Plan in his book The Cyprus Problem. One such concern was property and settlement. Many Greek Cypriot families in the North lost homes and land to Turkish Cyrpiots fleeing from the South, so a long standing gripe has been the full return or compensation of lost property and land. This was coupled by the Greek Cypriot push that any reunification should enshrine the right to settle wherever on the island (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 87). The Annan Plan restricted resettlement and created a framework where one-third of the property is returned, one third will be compensated for which “each community would pay to its own members,” and the last third (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 85).
The Greek Cypriot community felt great resentment at both property and settlement stipulations even though it seems that they would have benefited greatly from this outline. For example, Ker-Lindsay discusses the appreciation of the bonds, describing how “these bonds could have become very valuable,” and notes that many Greek Cypriots after the invasion found “new lives, jobs, and friends,” and subsequently unlikely to give up the last thirty years of adjustment to return to a long-lost home (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 86-7). Yet despite the possible monetary benefits from the Annan Plan and the lack of will for most relocated Greek Cypriots to realistically move back north, the Greek Cypriot community insisted that the Plan should enshrine the principle of both property and settlement.
For Turkish Cypriots however, the Annan Plan’s approach to property and settlement was beneficial as they were concerned about the livelihoods of Turkish Cypriots and recent immigrants from mainland Turkey who now owned property in the north. More importantly was the concern that unrestricted settlement could “lead to large numbers of Greek Cyoriots moving into the Turkish Cypriot federal state” (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 85). Essentially, Turkish Cyrpiorts were worried that unrestricted settlement would shift demographics in North Cyprus, turning Turkish Cypriots into a minority in both the North and the South. Logistically, the likelihood of a massive influx of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots in the north is low; one could argue that, provided the lack of will for many to uproot their lives once again, the debate essentially comes down, not to logistical issues, but to resentment and demand for rectification on the Greek Cypriot side clashing with the fear of historical victimization repeating itself on the Turkish Cypriot side.
Another key logistical issue of the Annan Plan was security. The Greek Cypriot community argued for the complete “withdrawal of Turkish troops (and settlers)” whose presence as a third party power they believed to be antithetical to sovereignty (Michael 2007, 593). Turkish Cypriots diametrically opposed as they saw “the presence of Turkish troops and the continued right of Turkish intervention, as the ultimate guarantee of their security” (Ker-Lindsay 2022a).
This seems like a fundamentally intractable situation but analysis of incentives reveal that Greek Cypriots are frustrated with the interventions of external powers which have only complicated matters in the past, and thus feel a consequent resentment against events such as Turkey’s 1974 invasion. Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, are concerned about the safety of the Turkish Cypriot people due to the historical precedent of intercommunal violence enacted by Greek Cypriot ethno-nationalist militants on Turkish Cypriot non-combatants. Thus, it can be argued that the issue of security, which seems logistical, is in actuality about perception and “past hurts” (Yilmaz 2010, 35). This is exemplified with Ker-Lindsay noting that “while finding a solution to the question of security will not be easy, there are nevertheless options that might well, with the right circumstances and good will, lead to a mutually acceptable compromise” (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 90). The Annan Plan introduced one such solution with the “sunset clause” which involved a significant but gradual reduction of non Cypriot troops, yet it seemed to be without “the good will” as Greek Cypriot President Papadopolous called for a no vote at the 2004 referendum (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 90).
There are two more key concerns, governance and economic disparity, which will not be discussed here. Nevertheless, a pattern of fundamental distrust has manifested itself in logistical clashes; it seems that the failure of the Annan Plan was not failing to create creative and workable solutions, but rather failure to convince either side to agree to work towards said solutions. As Ker-Lindsay notes, “it was fairly clear what a settlement would look like…if another plan would be put forward today, I wouldn’t necessarily expect it to be drastically different from the Annan Plan” (Ker-Lindsay 2022b). He suggests throughout his various works that the Annan Plan, while not logistically perfect, was and still is an ideal solution to the Cyprus Problem. Yet, it failed nonetheless, due to deep rooted distrust of the other, which then brings us to the crux of this paper: how much of this distrust is ethno-religious?
Ethno-Religious Prejudice and Intercommunal Distrust
Unpacking the ethno-religious prejudice and intercommunal distrust is easily the most difficult part of this investigation. Professor Michalis S. Micheal argued in his “Critical Appraisal of the Annan Plan” that “the Cyprus conflict has never been between the island's two ethno-communities…rather, the Cyprus conflict has essentially pitted one brand of majoritarianism against another: that is, the Greek-Cypriot community against Turkey” (Michael 2007, 600). The reality is somewhere between the two, where existing ethno-religious divides between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were capitalized upon by political leaders, leading to the obstinate barrier of ethnic and intercommunal prejudice.
This view is reflected among Cypriot civilians; this author circulated a short questionnaire about the failure of the Annan Plan and its ethno-religious environment. The turnout was limited to five responses from Greek Cypriots only, and thus this author can not use the testimonials to extrapolate trends among all Greek Cypriots, much less for both communities. Rather, this author will refer back to the testimonials to introduce and conclude evidence backed summaries. It is noteworthy that when asked about how much of the intractable negotiations were due to ethno-religious animosity, one respondent stated that it was“60% based on ethno-religious animosity, 40% based on quantitative logistical issues” (Appendix A). Another respondent agreed that “the disagreement was not [based] in reality” and is mostly due to political whim while a third corroborated that it was “mostly distrust” created by leaders who could better control a divided populace.
It is admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to delineate how much of the Annan Plan failure was caused by ethno-religious prejudice and how much was due to poor political leadership. Ethnic and religious based prejudice caused historical divide and conflict which has then compounded and manifested itself as logistical issues. This section then attempts to address this by first unpacking the historical precedents for ethno-religious conflict then transitioning to an analysis of how political leaders utilized said historical precedents during the Annan Plan.
The Turkish Cypriot community developed under Ottoman rule, and has remained at a rough 20% of the total population, although this number is unverified due to the nature of Northern Cyprus’s unrecognized state (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 5-13). During this period, interaction between the two main ethnic groups were limited as most lived in homogenous communities, but the general consensus was that they “co-existed relatively peacefully during three centuries of Turkish rule” (Yilmaz 2010, 38). During this time, ethno-religious identities were inseparable from each community’s mainland, and there was little Cyprus-based ethnic, religious, or national identity (Yilmaz 2010, 38).
After Britain annexed Cyprus, strong ties to the motherland cropped up, particularly in the Greek Cypriot community that began to advocate for enosis, which championed reunification with Greece as the megali idea, or great ideal. In 1954, Archbishop and future Greek Cypriot President Makarios founded EOKA, an underground, pro-enosis guerrilla organization. Throughout the mid and late 50s, EOKA carried out domestic terrorist attacks on Turkish Cypriot civilians, killing and wounding hundreds and displacing 6000 as “32 villages were destroyed by the organization” (Yilmaz 2011, 44). The terrorist violence during this period sparked a Turkish Cypriot call for taksim, or secession. This issue is often under-discussed, especially given the proportion of its effect in laying down the foundations for distrust that persisted during the Annan Plan and persists today.
After the collapse of the Cypriot Republic, there was another period of intercommunal violence from 1963-1974 as Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves, hundreds of civilians were killed, and holy places and mosques were burned down (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). After the Greek-backed coup and Turkish invasion in July of 1974, there was another round of violence. This was punctuated by revenge killing by Greek Cypriot militants who attacked Turkish Cypriot civilians, with the mindset that “as they [Turkish Cypriots] shared ethnic identity of the attackers [Turkey], this constituted reasonable grounds for victimizing them…” (Loizos 1988, 645).
After the invasion, the international community universally condemned Turkey’s actions, and further condemned the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence of Turkish Cyprus. Thus, an economically and physically isolated northern Cyprus grew dependent on the mainland for economic and political support. This set the foundation for the pervasive distrust that ingrained itself in both communities after division in 1974.
For Turkish Cypriots, the historical ethno-religious animosity pushed many to demand for the Annan Plan — and indeed any resolution — to enshrine political equality to avoid being “sidelined by the majority Greek Cypriots” (Ker-Lindsay 2022b). Despite said concerns, two thirds of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan, dissenting against President Denktaş’ “no” campaign (Michael 2007, 597). This followed a period of distancing support for the Turkish motherland and a rise in Turkish Cypriot nationalism that shifted the ethnic identities from Turkish-based to Cyprus-based and increasing Turkish Cypriot support driven by economic expectations of reunification (Loizides 2007, 181-2; Yilmaz 2010, 52).
Unfortunately, the referendum could not garner Greek Cypriot support. The Greek Cypriot community remained resentful of the Turkish invasion and the subsequent lives and property lost, a sentiment that they believe was not addressed adequately in the Annan Plan as it failed to adequately rectify the actions of Turkey in 1974. Greek Cypriots were further suspicious of Turkish Cypriots due to their “heavy dependence…on support from mainland Turkey,” leading many to believe that “Turkish Cypriots were no more than pawns in a larger Turkish strategic design” (Michael 2007, 593).
Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan Plan likely exacerbated suspicions within the Greek Cypriot community; a zero-sum attitude within both communities lead to many believing mutual benefits impossible, and that the Turkish support “led many Greek Cypriots to conclude that they had received the raw deal” (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 70). From this we can deduce that previously mentioned logistical concerns were largely driven by this ethno-religious distrust, as even the best solutions may seem suspicious to a populous convinced of the malintent of the other side.
Poor Politics, Education, and Future Prospects
The context of intercommunal distrust causing the failure of the Annan Plan then begs the question of what exactly caused such pervasive intercommunal suspicion, or rather failed to assuage it. Ker-Lindsay lamented that within Greek Cyprus, “the political leadership had never really prepared people for what a bizonal bicommunal federation meant” and, in fact, “deliberately made sure that people didn’t really understand” what said solution would look like (Ker-Lindsay 2022a). The Greek Cypriot community was subsequently caught off guard by the Annan plan, and were not “psychologically ready for partnership” (Yilmaz 2010, 52). Professor Social and Political Sciences at the University of Cyprus Maria Hadjipavlou notes how, during the referendum,“people were not well informed. They were carried away by party interests and political rhetoric often based on misinformation or half-truths” (Hadjipavlou 2024).
The lack of communication and political leaders’ profiteering off of fear was only possible due to the intercommunal distrust. This distrust is perpetuated by nationalistic education systems that has “been a main vehicle of transferring intercommunal hostility, as well as separate identities, from generation to generation” (Yilmaz 2007, 58). This is a systems failure where “there has never been an integrative mechanism for the two communities to work and plan together, and have a shared curriculum or educational philosophy,” creating a situation where two educational systems on one island teach vastly different versions of history, prioritizing the ethnic-religious ties of each community over “developing a civic Cypriot identity” (Hadjipavlou 2024).
Thus, a priority for reunification would be to first reunify the education system into one that denationalizes the curriculum and aims to teach empathy and understanding of the other community. That being said, there is a lack of political will that must be addressed. Ker-Lindsay notes the wide range of conflicting sentiments about reunification within the Greek Cypriot community, meaning any political support would be a tossup. This creates a dilemma: if another referendum were to vote against reunification it could kill the political will for a solution for the foreseeable future, and “the world is likely to just give up” (Ker-Lindsay 2022b). Thus, many Cypriots would rather maintain the status quo of an uneventful impasse than pursue peace talks and face the possibility of permanent defeat.
Furthermore, as more Cypriots are born and raised in a divided Cyprus, fewer have memories of a shared community and personal experience living with members of the other ethnicity. To many young Cypriots, the other side “is essentially a foreign country inhabited by people who feel very alien despite their shared Cypriot heritage,” and the prevalence of distrust is no less pervasive among the youth (Ker-Lindsay 2022b; Appendix B). This creates a generation of ambivalent young Greek Cypriots, exemplified by the testimonials which reflected a sentiment that Greek Cypriots would theoretically want reunification but that “it can not be done” (Appendix A).
Thus, given the potential volatility of pushing for peace talks in the immediate future, slower and more sociological approaches to bridging divides may be best. These include facilitating constructive exposure through acquaintance programs with a shared goal such as encouraging current “music, theatre, and dance groups with members from both sides of the island, as well as joint environmental projects,” and encouragement from “community leaders such as religious leaders, politicians, etc.” (Hadjipavlou 2024; Yilmaz 2010, 53).
While reunification may be unforeseeable in the near future, integration can improve the current divided status quo and begin to deconstruct the pervasive prejudice. To quote respondent #3, “Cyprus was never just Greek and that's what makes this culture beautiful,” and if a unified peace is impossible, an integrated co-existence remains the best way forward.
Works Cited
Hadjipavlou, Maria, and Xenia Samoultseva. 2024. “Cyprus: A Path to Reconciliation.” Green European Journal. January 24, 2024. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/cyprus-a-path-to-reconciliation/.
Ker-Lindsay, James. 2011. The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press on Demand.
———. 2022a. “CYPRUS | Can It Still Be Solved?” Video. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dCDobf4ctUQ.
———. 2022b. “Cyprus | What Do You Want to Know?” Video. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=20syKiyPgqY.
Loizides, Neophytos G. 2007. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.” International Studies Perspectives 8 (2): 172–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/44214613.
Loizos, Peter. 1988. “Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus.” Man 23 (4): 639–53. https://doi.org/10.2307/2802597.
Michael, Michális S. 2007. “The Cyprus Peace Talks: A Critical Appraisal.” Journal of Peace Research 44 (5): 587–604. https://doi.org/10.2307/27640568.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. n.d. “How Did the Greek Cypriots Persecute the Turks of Cyprus Between 1963-1974? / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/how-did-the-greek-cypriots-persecute-the-turks-of-cyprus-between-1963-1974_.en.mfa.
Tzimitras, Harry, and Mete Hatay. 2016. “The Need for Realism: Solving the Cyprus Problem through Linkage Politics.” Turkey Project Policy Paper. Brookings Center on the United States and Europe.
Wright, George. 2004. “Greek Cypriot Leaders Reject Annan Plan.” The Guardian, April 22, 2004. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus.
Yılmaz, Muzaffer Ercan. 2010. “Past Hurts and Relational Problems in the Cyprus Conflict.” International Journal on World Peace 27 (2): 35–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/23266558.
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